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IN THE 
.SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of KENNETH 
G. SCRIVENER, Decew;ed. 
SHIRLEE S. SCRIVENER, Executrix of 
the Estate of Kenneth G. Scrivener, de-
ceased, Appellant, 
vs. 
ALBERT SCRIVENER and MRS. AL-
BERT SCRIVENER, as Trustees for Greg-
ory Scrivener, a Minor, Respondents. 
BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
SHIRLEE S. 
SCRIVENER, 
Executrix. 
Case No. 8186 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SHIRLEE S. SCRIVENER, Executrix 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kenneth G. Scrivener, the deceased herein, died 
on January 3, 1953, as a result of an accident, and 
left surviving him a son, Gregory A. Scrivener, six 
years of age, and Shirlee S. Scrivener, his surviving 
widow. Gregory is the son of Kenneth G. Scrivener 
by a former marriage with Ruth E. Scrivener, which 
marriage terminated in divorce. (R. 20) 
Kenneth G. Scrivener took out a policy of life 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
insurance on his life with the Prudential Insurance 
Company of America, dated June 20, 1949, which 
policy was in the face amount of Five Thousand and 
no/100 ( $5,000.00) Dollars and contained a pro-
vision for double indemnity in the event of accidental 
death (Exhibit 1). 
The original beneficiary named in the insurance 
policy was "Ruth E. Scrivener, wife, if living, other-
wise Gregory A. Scrivener, son." A change of bene-
ficiary was made on February 2, 1950, to "Alberta 
G. Scrivener, mother, if living, otherwise Gregory 
A. Scrivener, son." A further change of beneficiary 
was made on September 11, 1950, as follows: "If 
this policy matures by death the proceeds shall be 
payable in one lump sum to the executors or admin-
istrators of the insured." (Exhibit 1) . 
The insurance company paid to the Executrix 
of the Estate of Kenneth G. Scrivener the sum of 
Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Five and 
99/100 ( $9,995.99) Dollars, made up as follows: 
Amount of Policy No. 17 655 702 
Paid-up Additions dividends 
Premiums deducted $14.70 
Accidental Death Benefits 
(Exhibit 2). 
$5,000.00 
10.69 
$5,000.00 
$9,995.99 
The Third and Fourth paragraphs of the Last 
Will and Testament of the decedent, which was ad-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
mitted to probate, are as follows: 
"THIRD, I hereby give, devise and be-
queath to my parents, MR. and MRS. ALBERT 
SCRIVENER, or the survivor of them, of Roch-
ester, New York, my $5,000.00 life insurance 
with The Prudential Insurance Company of 
America, Policy #17655702, to be held in trust 
for the uses and purposes hereinafter set forth: 
They, the said MR. and MRS. ALBERT 
SCRIVENER, or the survivor, as such trustees, 
shall have full power to manage and control 
the $5,000.00 principal derived from said life 
insurance policy, with the power to invest and 
reinvest same as they may see fit so to do for 
the purpose of educating, maintaining and sup-
porting my son, GREGORY SCRIVENER, un-
til such time as he shall reach the age of twenty-
one years, at which time the said trustees are 
to pay over to my son, GREGORY, the balance, 
if any, of the $5,000.00, and after such pay-
ment, the said trustees shall then be discharged 
from any further liability on their part. PRO-
VIDED, that if my parents predecease me, or 
that if they decease prior to the execution of 
said trust, I then request my brother, CLIF-
FORD G. SCRIVENER, of St. Louis, Missouri, 
be appointed substitute trustee, to be succeeded 
by my sister, MARY ELLEN WOODS of Roch-
ester, New York, if need be. 
"FOURTH, I hereby give, devise and be-
queath the rest and remainder of my estate and 
property, be it real, personal or mixed, and 
wheresoever it may be situated, to my wife, 
SHIRLEE S. SCRIVENER, of Salt Lake City, 
Utah.'' 
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There is no dispute about the facts. The ques-
tion is one of law, whether Gregory, the son and 
beneficiary of the Trust, or Shirlee S. Scrivener, the 
widow, is entitled to the proceeds of the double in-
demnity provision of the insurance policy. The 
lower Court held in favor of Gregory and the Exec-
utrix has appealed to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I 
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY 
IS LIMITED TO LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS 
ONLY. 
POINT NO. II 
THE CONTRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
AND DOUBLE INDEMNITY ARE SEPARATE 
AND DISTINCT. 
POINT NO. III 
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY 
DOES NOT INCLUDE DOUBLE INDEMNITY 
BENEFITS. 
POINT NO. IV 
BY MAKING HIS ESTATE THE BENE-
FICIARY OF THE INSURANCE POLICY THE 
DECEDENT EVIDENCED AN INTENTION TO 
LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY 
IS LIMITED TO LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS 
ONLY. 
The essential parts of the Third paragraph of 
the Will of the above named decedent are as follows: 
"THIRD, I ... give ... to my parents ... 
my $s,ooo.oo life insurance with The Pruden-
tial Insurance Company of America, Policy 
#17655702, to be held in trust for the uses and 
purposes hereinafter set forth : . . . such Trus-
tees, shall have full power to manage and con-
trol the $s,ooo.oo principal derived from said 
life insurance policy, with the power to invest 
or reinvest same as they may see fit so to do 
for the purpose of educating, maintaining and 
supporting my son, Gregory Scrivener, un-
til such time as he shall reach the age of 
twenty-one years, at which time the said Trus-
tees are to pay over to my son Gregory--;the 
balance, if any, of the $s,ooo.oo, and after such 
payment, the said Trustees shall then be dis-
charged from any further liability on their 
part." (Emphasis ours) 
The following portion of the Third paragraph: 
"I ... give ... to my parents ... my $5,000.00 life 
insurance with The Prudential Insurance Company 
of America, Policy #17655702" is fairly susceptible 
of only one interpretation, that is, that the subject 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
of the bequest is life insurance only. The Decedent 
made no bequest of the policy itself. Although the 
words and figures, "Policy No. 17655702" are used, 
yet according to the context and punctuation they 
are merely for identification and not a part of the 
bequest. Neither did the Decedent make a bequest 
of the proceeds of the Policy. Inasmuch as life insur-
ance and not the Policy or the proceeds thereof was 
the subject of the bequest it follows, as will more 
fully be shown hereafter, that double indemnity 
benefits are not a part of the bequest to Gregory. 
Further indication of a limitation of the be-
quest is found in the Third paragraph. The Trustees 
were to "have full power to manage and control the 
$5,ooo.oo principal derived from said life insurance 
policy," and after Gregory became 21 years of age 
the Trustees were directed "to pay over to my son 
Gregory the balance, if any of the $5,ooo.oo." Had 
the Decedent intended to give all of the proceeds of 
the policy in question to Gregory he would not have 
used the language quoted above, for such language 
is inconsistent with an intent to dispose of all of 
the proceeds of the Policy. It is a common thing 
for an insurance policy to have values other than 
the "principal," such as interest, dividends, and 
health benefits; and, as in this case, double indem-
nity accident benefits. Some, all, or part of such 
benefits may be made the subject of a bequest by 
Will, but if the bequest is described as "$5,ooo.oo 
life insurance" or "$5,ooo.oo principal," such other 
benefits as the Policy may have are excluded there-
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from. Appellant's contention is further supported 
by the fact that the Trustees were given power to 
"control the $5,000.00 principal derived from said 
life insurance policy." The word "derived" not only 
indicates the source of the fund but also implies 
only part or a portion of the whole thereof. 
The intent of the Decedent to limit the bequest 
is further borne out by the fact that the .Trust is 
limited to "$5,ooo.oo principal." There is no pro-
vision in the Trust to cover the funds which theRe-
spondents seek in this action. The Trustees are 
granted no power or right to control, dispose of or 
handle the funds which they are attempting to re-
cover herein. The Decedent has made it clear that 
he never intended that the Trustees should admin-
ister anything other than the "$5,ooo.oo principal" 
mentioned in the Trust. Indeed the Decedent has 
provided that when Gregory reaches the age of 21 
years the Trustees are directed to pay to him the 
balance, if any, of the $5,000.00. 
Reference to the entire object is oft-times eas-
ier than to refer to a part of it. Such is true in this 
case. Had the Decedent intended that the whole of 
the Policy go for the benefit of his son Gregory it 
would have been a simple thing for him to have so 
provided. Likewise, had such been his intention, the 
subject of the Trust could have been described very 
easily; but, instead of using simple words and 
phrases to describe the entire Policy, the Decedent 
made a bequest of "$5,ooo.oo life insurance" and 
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instead of simply referring to the funds or proceeds 
of the Policy he .described the subject of the Trust by 
the words and figures "$5,000.00 principal"; and 
again, to emphasize his intent, stated that the "bal-
ance, if any, of the $5,ooo.oo" was to be given to 
Gregory on his reaching 21 years of age. 
The Respondents would have this Court believe 
that the Decedent intended all of the proceeds of the 
Policy to go to Gregory. If there is any basis for 
the Respondents' contention it must be found in the 
dispositive portion of the Third Paragraph. The 
Trust portion of the paragraph has the limitations 
herein pointed out, which clearly do not support 
Respondents' contention and are inconsistent with 
the interpretation Respondents would have this 
Court place on the dispositive portion of the para-
graph. It is a cardinal principal of construction 
that all parts of the Will must be read together and 
harmonized if possible. There is no harmony be-
tween the despositive and the Trust portions of the 
Third paragraph under Respondents' theory. How-
ever, according to Appellant's theory, there is no 
inconsistency in the provisions. Surely the Trust 
provisions cannot be ignored. It is submitted that 
the interpretation urged by the Appellant permits 
of har1nony and consistency and gives full consider-
ation to all portions of the Will, and properly re-
flects the intent of the Decedent. 
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POINT NO. II 
THE CONTRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
AND DOUBLE INDEMNITY ARE SEPARATE 
A.ND DISTINCT. 
The insurance policy provides for quarterly 
premiums and states, "Extra premium for acciden-
tal means death benefit (included in total premium) 
$1.30" Other provisions covering the contract for 
double indemnity or "accidental means death bene-
fit," as it is called in the Policy, are found on Page 
7 thereof. (Exhibit 1) 
The law is clear that the contract for double 
indemnity is separate and distinct from the contract 
for insurance, although contained in the same poli-
cy. The following general statement is found in 44 
C.J .S. 1286: 
"Life insurance policies containing pro-
visions for double indemnity and disability 
provisions, for which separate premiums are 
paid are regarded as containing distinct con-
tracts respecting different objects even though 
contained in one instrument." 
New York Life Insurance Company vs. Davis, 
5 Fed. Supp. 316. This case held that double indem-
nity and disability provisions of an insurance policy 
are severable if a separate premium is charged for 
them, and that the policy with respect to said bene-
fits can be cancelled even after the life portion of 
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the con tract cannot be cancelled by reason of the 
incontestability clause. In discussing this question 
the Court said on Page 319: 
"That the parties themselves considered 
that these provisions of the policy were sever-
able may be gathered from the following lang-
uage contained in the policy: 'Upon written 
request of the insured on any anniversary of 
this policy, and upon return of this policy for 
proper endorsement, the company will termin-
ate this provision' and thereafter the premium 
shall be reduced by the amount charged for the 
double indemnity benefit." 
(NOTE : This is the same provision as found 
on Page 7 in the Scrivener policy) 
Anair vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 42 
Atl. 2d 423 (Vt.) 159 A.L.R. 547. 
The policy was issued October 1, 1926, and pro-
vided for certain monthly payments if the Insured 
became totally and presumably permanently dis-
abled before age sixty. The annual premium was 
$128.60, of which it is stated ( $5.00 is the premium 
for the double indemnity benefit and $16.15 is the 
premium for disability benefits.) On November 12, 
1935, the Insured assigned her right, title and in-
terest in the policy to a bank, and on November 25, 
1935, the bank authorized the Insurance company 
to pay all disability benefits to the Insured. This is 
an action by the Insured for the benefits. The Insur-
ance company contended that the Insured had no 
right to sue for the reason that it claimed the Insured 
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had assigned the policy. It was held that the contract 
was divisible and that the Insured had a right of 
action for disability benefits even though the policy 
had been assigned, inasmuch as the bank had in 
effect reassigned to the Insured the right to the 
disability benefits. 
The following is a statement by the Court: 
"The defendent says that the policy pro-
vides for the payment of a single premium and 
that this singleness of consideration is recog-
nized by our cases as showing an entire con-
tract. But here we do not have a single consid-
eration within the meaning of these cases. The 
total premium of $128.60 is shown by the policy 
to be comprised of three different premiums, 
one of which for a specific amount is set forth 
as the premium for disability benefits. Thus 
the consideration was apportioned to the dif-
ferent covenants contained in the policy. The 
risks assumed by the defendant under the poli-
cy were distinct and severable with different 
premiums assigned to cover each of them. We 
conclude that the policy contract in question 
was not one entire contract, but constituted 
separate and distinct contracts. Russo v. New 
York Life Ins. Co. 158 Miss. 469, 128 So. 343, 
69 A.L.R. 883; Armstrong v. Illinois Bankers 
Life Ass'n 217 Ind. 601, 29 NE 2d 415, 131 
A.L.R. 769; 1 Am. Jur. Actions, pp 105, 106; 
Annotation, 69 A.L.R. 889." 
Armstrong vs. Illinois Bankers Life Associa-
tion, 29 NE 2d 415 (Ind.), 131 A.L.R. 769. 
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This was a policy for life insurance containing 
disability benefits, a separate premium being pro-
vided for each. It was held that where the insured 
assigned his rights under the policy to his wife, but 
retained his right to disability benefits that she 
could sue for a breach of the policy and he could 
maintain a separate action for disability benefits. 
Russo vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 
128 S. 343 (Miss.) 69 A.L.R. 883, held that where 
the policy contained separate provisions for sick 
benefits and life insurance on death of insured they 
give rise to separate causes of action and that an 
action on the life insurance provisions will not bar 
a later action for the disability benefits. 
Chattanooga Sewer Pipe Works vs. Dumler, 120 
S. 450 (Miss.) 62 A.L.R. 999. In this action the 
Plaintiff secured judgment against the Insured and 
garnisheed the New York Life Insurance Company 
to obtain the proceeds of a judgment which the In-
sured had obtained against the insurance company 
for disability benefits under the insurance policy. It 
was contended by the Defendant that the money was 
not subject to garnishment because it was exempt 
under a statute which provided that the proceeds 
of a life insurance policy not exceeding $5,000.00 
should be exempt from the debts of the decedent. 
The Court action held that the disability benefits 
·were not "proceeds of life insurance" and that they 
were not exempt under the statute and were subject 
to garnishment. The Court stated as follov.rs: 
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"In the case at bar, the money involved is 
in no proper sense the proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy. It is true that it arises out of one 
of the provisions of a policy of insurance on 
the life of the appellee, but this provision is a 
contract of indemnity wholly separate from the 
contract to pay a fixed sum upon the death of 
the insured." 
POINT NO. III 
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY 
DOES NOT INCLUDE DOUBLE INDEMNITY 
BENEFITS. 
There is nothing in the Will from which it can 
be ascertained whether the Decedent at the time of 
its execution had in mind the double indemnity 
feature of the policy. However, we submit that 
whether he did or did not have such feature in mind 
makes no difference. If it be assumed that he did 
have double indemnity benefits in mind and intended 
to dispose of them in his Will, he failed to do so in 
the specific bequest, for the reason that the specific 
bequest covers life insurance only and does not cover 
double indemnity benefits. 
On the other hand, if it be assumed that the 
Decedent did not have the double indemnity feature 
in mind at the time of excuting the Will, he made 
no provisions for disposing of the double indemnity 
benefit except in the residuary clause. It is axiom-
atic that for the Decedent to make a specific bequest 
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he must have the specific property in mind and the 
property must be so described as to be capable of 
identification. In re: Campbell's estate, 27 Utah 
361, 75 Pac. 851. 
A situation quite analagous to the case at hand 
is Waters vs. Hatch 79 SW 916 (Mo.) 
The Will contained the following provision: 
"I hold two certificates in the Bankers Life 
Insurance Company . . . of $2,000.00 each 
($4,000.00). It is my will that as soon as the 
insurance company pays the money that the 
notes of W. H. Hatch & Son ... amounting to 
about the sum of $2,400.00 shall be paid first 
"I give my widow $500.00 
I give to my daughter, Mrs. Vernon 500.00 
I give to my daughter, Mrs. Flower 500.00 
I give to my son, 
Frank Hatch, the bal. 100.00 
$4,000.00 
Accumulations on the policy in the amount of 
$190.00 in excess of the amount stated in the Will 
were paid. It was contended by Frank Hatch that 
by reason of the words "the bal." that he was en-
titled to the additional accumulation. The Court, 
however, held that he was not entitled to anything 
more than $100.00, as provided for in the Will. In 
discussing this the Court said: 
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" ... It is lastly claimed that the appellant, 
Frank B. Hatch, is entitled to the $190.00 ex-
cess arising out of the $4,000.00 insurance 
policy ... after paying the $2,400.00 due to the 
Bank, and after paying the specific legacies 
... The Policy was for $4,000.00. The Will 
disposed of $4,000.00. By reason, however, of 
the payment of $100.00 on the policy after the 
Will was made, and before his death, and by 
reason of certain earnings of the company that 
the insured became entitled to, the policy yielded 
an excess of $190.00 over the face value. The 
claim of the appellant is based upon the words 
"the bal." on the line of the Will relating to this 
policy after Frank's name, and although this 
is followed by the figures "$100.00" it is con-
tended that it was the intention to give him 
whatever remained of the policy, ... The Ap-
pellant overlooks the point, however, that by so 
contending he admits that, so far as this devise 
to him is concerned, such a construction would 
subject the devise to him to a claim that it was 
thereby made general, and not definite and spe-
cific, and, if this is true, then the $100 named, 
as well as the excess of $190.00 would be sub-
ject to appropriation to the payment of debts 
and expenses of the estate. But aside from 
this, the claim that this $190.00 excess is a spe-
cific, or even a general, legacy is untenable. It 
was not in the contemplation of the Testator 
when he drew the Will, and a part of it was 
not in existence at that time, and was there-
fore no part of a specific thing which he was 
separating from the balance of his estate and 
disposing of specifically. The Appellant gets 
all of the specific legacy arising out of the in-
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surance policy which his father intended that 
he have ... " (Emphasis ours) 
If Hatch, in the above case, was denied the ac-
cumulations of the policy, where the provisions of 
the Will gave him a specific amount from the policy 
but also indicated he was to have the "balance," it 
would seem that there is less merit to the claim of 
the Respondents herein to double indemnity benefits 
under the terms of the Will in this case, where the 
bequest is "$s,ooo.oo life insurance" and the Trust 
is limited as heretofore pointed out. 
POINT NO. IV 
BY MAKING HIS ESTATE THE BENE-
FICIARY OF THE INSURANCE POLICY THE 
DECEDENT EVIDENCED AN INTENTION TO 
LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY. 
The life insurance policy shows the following 
with respect to beneficiaries: (Exhibit 1) The or-
iginal beneficiary named in the policy is Ruth E. 
Scrivener, wife, if living, otherwise Gregory A. 
Scrivener, son. A change of beneficiary was made 
on February 2, 1950, to Alberta G. Scrivener, 
mother, if living, otherwise Gregory A. Scrivener, 
son. A further change of beneficiary was made on 
September 11, 1950, which provides as follows: 
"If this policy rna tures by death the proceeds shall 
be payable in one sum to the Executors or Adminis-
trators of the insured." By changing·the beneficiary 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
from individuals (first his former wife, then his 
mother, with his son as alternate beneficiary) to his 
estate, the Testator intended to limit the amount 
which was to go to his son, as by making his estate 
the beneficiary of the policy such had the effect of 
subjecting the proceeds of the policy to the claims of 
creditors and to other beneficiaries named in the 
Will. 
CONCLUSION 
We have made a thorough search but have been 
unable to find a case which is completely determin-
ative of the problem involved in this case. We submit, 
however, that all of the facts and circumstances dis-
cussed herein point unmistakably to the fact that 
the Decedent never intended the double indemnity 
benefits of the policy to go to Gregory. Had the De-
cedent intended such benefits to belong to Gregory 
the easiest and surest method of effecting his inten-
tion would have been to make Gregory the bene-
ficiary of the policy. Not having done this, the next 
easiest and simplest method would have been to 
make a bequest by Will of the policy or proceeds 
thereof to Gregory. Instead of doing either of these 
things the Decedent did practically the opposite. 
Gregory was formerly named alternate beneficiary 
in the policy. However, the Decedent changed the 
beneficiary from his mother and Gregory to his es-
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tate and made a Will in which he bequeathed life 
insurance benefits, only, in trust for Gregory and 
placed the limitations on the Trust herein pointed 
out. 
We submit that the lower Court erred in award-
ing judgment to the Respondents for the double in-
demnity benefits and that such judgment should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
of ROMNEY, BOYER AND RONNOW 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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